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I am honored to be part of this celebration of Professor Chiu 
Hungdah‘s life and accomplishments. Professor Chiu was a scholar 
and a mentor to me. Even after all our years of friendship, he 
remained the respected ―Professor Chiu.‖ When I started out in my 
academic career some 25 years ago, it was to Professor Chiu‘s 
intellect and his extensive library that I first turned. At the time, there 
were few Chinese law related materials available (primary or 
secondary), which stands in stark contrast to present day, where there 
seems to be an overabundance of materials (some accurate, but many 
not). Professor Chiu was one of the first to have a comprehensive 
collection of good and relevant Chinese-language law materials. If 
the material was in Professor Chiu‘s collection, I knew it to be a 
reliable source. And so, every Wednesday for the first year of my 
academic career, I would drive from D.C. to Baltimore, park my car, 
and come in for a day‘s research. Eventually, I also learned to bring 
my ―bento‖ box lunch because each day at noon Professor Chiu, Mrs. 
Wu, and whoever was working in the office that day, would sit down 
around a long conference table in the library for lunch. It was a time 
for conversation and advice. Through these lunchtime talks, Professor 
Chiu became a friend and a mentor. 
I also learned quite a bit about the Chinese legal system from 
Professor Chiu‘s writings. In preparation for this conference, I pulled 
out Leng & Chiu‘s Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China, written in 
the early 1980s. Presciently, the conclusions contained in that book 
 
†
 Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law, Co-Director of the Program on 
Human Rights and the Global Economy. 
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remain relevant today. In expressing caution about the future of 
Chinese legal reforms, Professor Chiu noted that, ―[b]oth socialist 
and traditional theories put emphasis on order over freedom, duties 
over rights, and group interests over individual ones.‖1 This 
assessment of the Chinese legal order remains as true today as it was 
then.  
I teach civil procedure, a seemingly technical area. But it is 
procedure and the promise of regular and consistent process in 
enforcing legal norms and a method to check arbitrary powers that 
underlie the ―rule of law.‖ Free market reformers have long argued 
that a predictable and consistent legal system established to support 
markets will also inevitably lead to rule of law and a more democratic 
state.2 A democratic state, they argue, promotes greater inclusiveness 
not only in lawmaking but also in law enforcement.3 Courts are seen 
as public places where citizens can adjust top-down dictates to 
bottom-level realities, and participate in the shaping of norms 
applicable to everyday life.4 The United States, for example, with its 
historic distrust of government authorities, has entrusted private civil 
litigants with the role of enforcing certain legal norms and civil 
litigation as one vehicle in developing public norms. With this 
broader public function for civil litigation, American civil procedure 
developed to accommodate easier access to courts for individual 
citizens and give great autonomy to parties in court to shape, develop, 
and prove their litigation.5  
 
 1. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST MAO CHINA: 
ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS 171 (1985). 
 2. See generally SAMANTHA F. RAVICH, MARKETIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: EAST ASIAN 
EXPERIENCES 7–30 (2000); Adel M. Abdellatif, Good Governance and its Relationship to 
Democracy and Economic Development, GLOBAL FORUM III ON FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND 
SAFEGUARDING INTEGRITY (May 20-31, 2003), available at http://www.pogar.org/ 
publications/governance/aa/goodgov.pdf. 
 3. See supra note 2. 
 4. See, e.g., DANIEL BUTT, DEMOCRACY, THE COURTS AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC 
POLICY, THE FOUNDATION FOR LAW, JUSTICE AND SOCIETY, 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Butt_Policy_Brief%232%23.pdf (last visited Feb. 
26, 2012) (noting the growth in a court‘s role in influencing and determine policy outcomes, 
in areas ranging from welfare spending to environmental protection). 
 5. One of the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is ―to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
See also the liberal joinder rules, which give litigants the ability to shape claims and parties 
in the litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 18 & 20. For a historical overview, see Whether the Supreme 
Court Has Limited Americans‟ Access to the Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3–7 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger 
Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf. 
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To what extent does China challenge the above assumptions 
regarding the public and possibly democratic role of the courts? In 
recent years, China has experimented with participatory lawmaking 
by opening its laws for comment and citizen participation.6 Similarly, 
China has also seen an increase in private citizen law enforcement 
due to a dramatic increase in recent decades in the rate of civil 
litigation.7 But much like the policies it has pursued in the economic 
sphere, the Chinese state retains substantial discretion and control 
over the form and manner of legal development,8 not to mention its 
control over legal institutions, including the process of litigation.9 
The developmental state is characterized by deep state involvement 
in economic development and, in the case of China, extends to legal 
developments such as guiding major litigation and resolution of 
socially significant disputes, even when those disputes are between 
private parties.10 One recent mass tort case not only illustrates 
Professor Chiu‘s prognosis that the Chinese legal system will 
continue to put ―emphasis on order over freedom, duties over rights, 
and group interests over individual ones,‖11 but also how the legal 
system accommodates the state‘s role and the development of a 
multi-track litigation system. 
 
 6. ―Laws shall be made in order to embody the will of the people, enhance socialist 
democracy and guarantee that the people participate in legislative activities through various 
channels.‖ Legislation Law of the People‘s Republic of China (Order of the President No. 
31) (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Apr. 29, 2000, effective Sept. 1, 
2000), art. 5, http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm. See also id. arts. 16, 
29, 34, 58; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Comes to China, ADMIN. & 
REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2006, at 5, 5–6, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/adminlaw/news/ 
adlaw_fall2006.pdf. 
 7. Huazhong Wang & Jingqiong Wang, Courts Hit by Rising Number of Lawsuits, 
China Daily, July 14, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/14/content_ 
10102630.htm. 
 8. During the 2007 National Conference on Political-Legal Work, Chinese President 
Hu Jintao told the assembled judges, procurators and officials: ―In their work, the grand 
judges and grand procurators shall always regard as supreme: the party's cause, the people's 
interest and the constitution and laws.‖ Jerome Cohen, Op-Ed., Body Blow for the Judiciary, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 2008, at 17 [hereinafter Cohen, Body Blow]. In 2008, this 
policy was actively implemented by the new head of the Supreme People‘s Court Wang 
Shengjun (王胜俊) as the ―Three Supremes‖: 1. ―Supremacy of the business of the CCP‖ 
(党的事业至上); 2. ―Supremacy of the interests of the people‖ (人民利益至上); 3. 
―Supremacy of constitutional law‖ (宪法法律至上). See Jerome Cohen, Jerome Cohen on 
the “Three Supremes” (Oct. 22, 2008), CHINESE L. PROF BLOG, http://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2008/10/jerome-cohen--1.html.  
 9. See Cohen, Body Blow, supra note 8. 
 10. See generally Amiya Kumar Bagchi, The Past and Future of the Developmental 
State, 6 J. WORLD SYS. RES. 398 (2000), available at http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol6/ 
number2/pdf/jwsr-v6n2-bagchi.pdf. 
 11. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 1, at 171. 
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I. THE ARMILLARISIN A CASE12 
In April 2006, shortly after taking Armillarisin A injections, a 
medication used to treat gallstones and gastritis, patients in the Third 
Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University13 (Hospital) in 
Guangzhou City began to suffer from acute renal failure.14 Qiqihaer 
the Second Pharmaceuticals Limited (Qiqihaer Pharmaceuticals) 
produced the injections, and Guangdong Medicines and Health 
Products (Guangdong Medicines) distributed them under an 
agreement with Jinhengyuan, another distributor. 15 After discovering 
these patient injuries, the Hospital stopped using the medicine and 
reported what they had found to the Center for ADR Monitoring, the 
government entity responsible for monitoring the quality and safety 
of medicine in China.16 The central government immediately created 
an investigative team, while the local government gathered an expert 
panel.17 The panel concluded that Armillarisin A injections had 
negatively impacted those patients with acute renal failure and 
neurologic lesions, agreeing with the Hospital‘s suspicions.18 The 
Center for ADR Monitoring then issued an order halting distribution 
of Armillarisin A medications throughout China.19  
 
 12. Margaret Y.K. Woo & Cai Yanmin, China's Developmental State and the Challenge of 
Formal Process: The Case of Counterfeit Medicine, 49 SUP. CT. L. REV. 361 (2010). The 
Armillarisin A case was litigated by Professor Cai Yanmin, of Zhongshan University. Much 
of the information contained in the following section was originally published in this 
previous article. 
 13. Id. at 363.  
 14. Id. See also Suspect Held as Bogus Drug Kills 4, XINHUA GEN. NEWS. SERV., May 
15, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/15/content_4546421.htm. 
 15. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra 12, at 363. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Investigation Continues into Bogus Drug Maker, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., 
May 15, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/15/content_4545842.htm. 
Taixing Chemical Plant substituted Diglycol, a cheaper drug, for propylene glycol, an 
inactive ingredient in Armillarisin A. Diglycol is a toxic industrial material that can cause 
severe kidney, liver, and neurological damage. Duan Hongqing, et al., Toxic Shots Kill at 
Least Nine Patients, CAIJING MAGAZINE (May 29, 2006), http://english.caijing.com.cn/2006-
05-29/10008363.html. 
 19. Margaret Y.K. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 363. As I have described 
elsewhere:  
The Health Department of Guangdong Province formed expert panels on May 
26, 2006 and July 12, 2006, respectively. A preliminary diagnosis was made 
after a series of tests on each patient that had taken Armillarisin A medications. 
On May 22, 2006, the Health Department made a request to the State Council 
and the Ministry of Health, asking that more experts be sent to diagnose the 
patients. The State Council assigned the Ministry of Health, the State Food and 
Drug Administration and the Chinese Medical Association to the job on May 
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On July 19, 2006, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and the Standing 
Committee of the State Council concluded that Qiqihar 
Pharmaceuticals had used fake pharmaceutical materials during the 
production process.20 The government launched a criminal 
prosecution, during which ―one of the defendants made the surprising 
admission that Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals had bribed officials to obtain 
a Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certificate.‖21 As a result of 
the defective drug, close to 65 patients sustained renal failure, 14 of 
whom died with one patient in critical condition.22 Reflecting their 
dependence on the developmental state, parties injured by the 
contaminated medicine turned first to the Chinese government, rather 
than the courts, for relief. Responding to the clamor for relief from 
the 60 injured patients, the provincial government formed a 
coordinating team to mediate the claims.23 Eventually, the team asked 
the Hospital to compensate the patients; over 40 eventually settled.24  
While the course of this dispute on the surface may have 
parallels in the U.S. system, there are distinctive differences traceable 
to the Chinese preference for ―order over freedom, duties over rights 
and group interest over individual ones.‖ For one, the almost 
immediate turn to government-led mediation represents a continuing 
emphasis on ―order over freedom,‖ even in light of twenty years of 
legal reform towards greater legal formality. 
A. “Order over Freedom” 
Beginning in the 1980s and continuing in the ‘90s, Chinese civil 
justice grew both in greater professionalization of the judiciary and 
greater formalism in civil justice with an emphasis on adjudication 
over mediation. While ―[i]n the mid-1980s the Ministry of Justice 
 
27, 2006. Together, they formed an investigation team, into which they then 
proceeded to invite leading experts. 
Id. at 363 n.3. 
 20. Id. at 364. See also id. at 364 n.4 (collecting citations). 
 21. Id. at 364 & n.5. See also id. at 364 n.6 (describing a Good Manufacturing Practice, 
or ―GMP‖ as ―a monitoring system to ensure the quality and safety of products sold in the 
Chinese market,‖ requiring ―manufacturing enterprises to maintain facilities in a good 
condition, [with] reasonable productions process[es], consistent quality control, and a strict 
examination system‖). 
 22. Wang Xiaolin (王晓林), Qieryao Jiayaoan Bufen Shouhairen Lingdao Peichangjin 
(―齐二药”假药案部分受害人领到赔偿金) [Fake Medicine Victims Receive 
Compensation], CAIJING (财经) [FINANCE] (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-
03-10/110116934.html. 
 23. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 364. 
 24. Id.  
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expected the courts to conclude no less than 80 percent of all civil 
disputes by mediation,‖25 the expectation in the 1990‘s was for courts 
to issue adjudicated decisions. Thus, the 1982 Chinese Civil 
Procedure Code emphasized mediation as the principal method of 
dispute resolution such that in conducting civil proceedings, the 
people‘s courts ―shall stress conciliation.26 By contrast, the 1991 
Civil Procedure Law emphasized adjudication, voluntariness, and 
party autonomy in civil cases.27 With an emphasis on adjudication for 
civil cases in the 1990s, there was also a corresponding shift in the 
responsibility to gather evidence from judges to litigants and an 
emphasis on party autonomy.28 In many ways, Chinese legal reforms 
took on the patina of the adversary system and the independent civil 
litigation process.29 Chinese citizens flocked to the courts and 
litigation rates rose dramatically in the 1990s.30 
But formal adjudication did not, according to some, provide an 
effective forum for the resolution of the growing social conflict. As 
the economic boom in China resulted in greater disparities in power 
and income, there was greater social unrest, an increase in letters or 
visits of complaint, known as xinfang (a method of petitioning 
seeking relief from governmental entities), and also, for reviews of 
cases even after final appeals to governmental entities and courts.31 In 
2005, President Hu Jintao called for the construction of a 
 
 25. See STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 272 
(1999). 
 26. Civil Procedure Law of the People‘s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. of the Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Mar. 8, 1982, implemented on a trial basis, 
Oct. 1, 1982), art. 6, http://www.novexcn.com/civil_procedure_law.html. 
 27. ―The aim of the Civil Procedure Law of the People‘s Republic of China is to protect 
the exercise of the litigation rights of the parties, ensure that the people‘s courts ascertain 
facts, distinguish right from wrong, apply the law correctly, try civil cases promptly.‖ Civil 
Procedure Law of the People‘s Republic of China (promulgated by the President of the 
People‘s Republic of China, Apr. 9, 1991), art. 2, www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/12/content_1383880.htm [hereinafter 1991 Civil Procedure Law]. Article 9, meanwhile, 
provided that, ―[i]n trying civil cases, the people‘s courts shall conduct conciliation under the 
principles of voluntariness and lawfulness; where conciliation efforts fail, the people‘s courts 
shall render judgments without delay.‖ Id. art. 9.  
 28. ―A party shall have the responsibility to provide evidence in support of its own 
propositions.‖ Id. art. 64. 
 29. Id. See also Renmin Fayuan Wunian Gaige Gangyao (人民法院五年改革纲要) 
[Five-year Reform Program of the People‘s Courts] (promulgated by Sup. People‘s Ct. Oct. 
20, 1999, effective Oct. 20, 1999) 62 SUP. PEOPLE‘S CT. GAZ. 185, Oct. 20, 1999, available 
at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=23701 [hereinafter 
First Five-Year Reform Program].  
 30. See LUBMAN, supra note 25, at 255. 
 31. See generally Carl Minzner, Xinfang: Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal 
Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 103 (2006). 
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―harmonious society‖ in an effort to stem this tide of social unrest.32 
The president of the Supreme People‘s Court, placing blame on the 
courts in failing to end disputes, followed suit and strongly 
encouraged people‘s courts to ―mediate cases that could be mediated, 
adjudicate cases that should be adjudicated, combining mediation 
with adjudication, concluding the case and ending the dispute 
concurrently.‖33 The message was that the ultimate goal is to end 
disputes, preserve harmony, and adjudication is merely one avenue, 
not necessarily the preferred avenue, towards the achievement of this 
goal.34  
While Chinese mediation remained commonly used for family 
and neighborhood disputes, even throughout the 1990s reform period, 
it was because they require the personal knowledge or understanding 
of the local residence/mediation committee. By contrast, litigation 
had been touted for arms-length economic disputes involving 
property or commerce.35 However, in the recent turn to mediation, 
the concern for stability has led to a strategy of government-based 
mediation even for economic disputes and in particular, for mass torts 
and collective actions.  
Significantly, in 2006, the Supreme People‘s Court identified 
selected categories of cases for enhanced mediation. These include 
cases of great public interest requiring the collaboration of the 
government and other relevant departments; class actions; 
complicated cases in which the parties‘ relationship is very tense and 
neither of the parties has a stronger case according to evidence; cases 
involving matters not governed by any legislation; very sensitive 
cases and cases of great social concern; and reviews of petitions and 
retrials.36 Concerns for social stability have led the courts to return to 
an endorsement of enhanced mediation, particularly for cases of 
 
 32. When addressing a high-level Party seminar recently in Beijing, Chinese President 
Hu Jintao instructed the country's leading officials and Party cadres to place ―building a 
harmonious society‖ at the top of their agenda. Maureen Fan, China‟s Party Leadership 
Declares New Priority: „Harmonious Society‟, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2006, at A18. 
 33. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 365. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Aaron Halegua, Reforming the People‟s Mediation System in Urban China, 35 HONG 
KONG L.J. 715, 720 (2005). 
 36. XIAO YANG (肖扬), ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GUANYU KAIZHAN GUIFAN SIFA XINGWEI 
ZHUANXIANG ZHENGGAI QINGKUANG DE BAOGAO (最高人民法院关于开展规范司法行为专 
项整改情况的报告) [REPORT OF THE SPC ON THE SITUATION OF LAUNCHING RECTIFICATION 
AND REFORM TO REGULATE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR] (Oct. 30, 2006), available at 
http://cms.npc.gov.cn:87/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=1&nodeid=1482&articleid=353
846&type=1. 
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―great social concern.‖37 Collective actions and joint tort litigation are 
now viewed as potentially destabilizing to society and discouraged 
both by Chinese courts‘ refusal to accept these cases and the 
imposition of stricter requirements for lawyers in taking on such 
cases.38 Instead, for mass torts cases, mediation can take place with or 
without the request of the parties and by governmental departments 
rather than through the ―neutrality‖ of a formal court process.39  
In the Armillarisin A case described above, the first course of 
action was the formation of a government-led mediation group. The 
mediation working group was composed of members of the 
provincial ministry of justice, the public health division, the public 
security division, and the letters and petitions division.40 Despite the 
fact that the Hospital might not have been the party who caused the 
injury, the group directed the Hospital to mediate with and, if 
appropriate, to compensate the victims.41 This reflected the 
government‘s focus on victim compensation, rather than 
―adjudication of right and wrong.‖42 With these priorities in mind, the 
Hospital had no choice but to negotiate with the victims.43 
This bifurcated process (that is, steering major cases towards 
mediation while allowing formal justice to run its course in run-of-
the-mill cases) has been utilized for other major cases such as those 
arising out of the Szechuan earthquake and the Sanlu milk 
contamination scandal.44 In both incidents, Chinese courts again 
refused to accept the cases and instead relied on the executive branch 
to step in to negotiate, mediate, and ultimately broker settlements.45 
For example, in the Sanlu contaminated milk powder incident, the 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Edward Wong, Families File Suit in Chinese Tainted Milk Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A19. Chinese lawyers had a difficult time filing a class action on 
behalf of 213 families of children who drank tainted milk. The Court refused to accept the 
case and instead encouraged mediation.. See also, Andrea Cheuk, Comment, The Li‟an 
(“Docketing”) Process: Barriers to Initiating Lawsuits in China and Possible Reforms, 26 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 72, 73–75 (2008).  
 39. Cheuk, supra note 38, at 73–75.  
 40. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 366. 
 41. Id. at 366–67. 
 42. Id. at 367. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Wong, supra note 38; Edward Wong, Parents of Schoolchildren Killed in China 
Quake Confirm Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2008, at A12; Chinese Court Rejects Parents‟ 
Earthquake Lawsuit, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/ 
2008/12/chinese-court-rejects-parents-earthquake-lawsuit/. 
 45. See supra note 44. 
13-WOO MACRO (Author Reviewed) DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2012 10:15 AM 
2012] BOUNDED LEGALITY  243 
estimated 300,000 injured victims similarly had their claims quickly 
and quietly resolved through apology and financial compensation.46 
The entire mediation was accomplished in less than a year. On 
September 16, 2008, the state inspection services announced that 
contaminated milk had been sold.47 In December 2008, the criminal 
prosecution of relevant parties occurred (the former chairwoman of 
Sanlu pled guilty)48 and on January 8, 2009, the Sanlu company paid 
132 million yuan into a fund set up by the government for the victims 
of the tainted milk.49  
In total, the Sanlu families received about 200,000 yuan 
($29,200) for the death of a child, 30,000 yuan ($4,400) for children 
suffering more serious injuries, and 2,000 yuan ($300) for less 
serious cases.50 More than 95% of the injured families have accepted 
compensation of this type.51 Those who participated in government 
mediation were denied access to Chinese courts.52 Chinese scholars 
touted ―the completeness of this resolution: for the victims‘ families; 
for the companies involved, which have avoided bankruptcy; and for 
society at large, for which the disruption of economic and social 
stability has been mitigated.‖53  
Certainly, government-led compensation efforts also happen in 
the United States. The U.S. federal government has stepped in to 
resolve compensation questions in instances of mass disasters such as 
the compensation fund established for victims of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and for victims of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.54 
 
 46. Fan Yu, Multi-Ways to Groups Tort Incident: Comparison of Sanlu Milk Powder and 
Hapatitis C Litigation of Japan, CHINA NAT‘L KNOWLEDGE INFRASTRUCTURE JOURNAL, 
http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-FXJA200902010.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 
2012). See also China Couple Gets Payout after Child Killed by Tainted Milk, CHANNEL 
NEWS ASIA, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific 
/view/402860/1/.html/. 
 47. David Barboza, China Says Complaints About Milk Began in 2007, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 24, 2008, at A8. 
 48. See China Milk Scandal “Guilty” Plea, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2008 19:14 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk2/hi/asia-pacific/7805560.stm; Edward Wong, Milk Scandal in China 
Yields Cash for Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at A10. 
 49. Edward Wong, Civil Suit Hearing Held in China‟s Milk Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
29, 2009, at A8. 
 50. China Couple Gets Payout after Child Killed by Tainted Milk, supra note 46. 
 51. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 367. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Fan Yu, supra note 46. 
 54. See KENNETH FEINBERG, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
MASTER OF THE 9/11 VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 3, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/final_report.pdf (describing the creation of the September 11th 
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The stated rationales for these funds have alternated between a need 
to mitigate the economic impact of mass torts and to compensate 
victims in the absence of an identifiable culprit. Ultimately, the 9/11 
fund was viewed as an expression of national grief and, therefore, 
unique and limited in its application.55 In most other mass tort cases 
between private parties, however, the United States will typically 
leave the resolution to the neutral forum of the judicial process.  
By contrast, concerns for stability and social unrest have led the 
Chinese government to take a more affirmative role in resolving and 
mediating mass tort cases as an initial matter rather than allow 
litigation. This is true even when the case is between two identifiable 
private parties and there is relatively little economic impact.56 In 
China, it is a top-down state policy of enhanced mediation for mass 
cases. The resurgence and embrace of mediation, particularly state-
initiated mediation, can be directly traced to the Chinese state‘s 
concern for stability and order rather than an individual‘s right to 
bring litigation.57  
In sum, while the 1980s and ‗90s saw the reformation of the civil 
courts and the implementation of formal process, more recent 
decades have seen a resurgence of mediatory justice.58 The greater 
affirmation of adjudication in the 1990s may be a response to the 
increase in commercial disputes between strangers due to market 
 
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 as part of a scheme to prevent the airline industry‘s 
collapse in the wake of 9/11, allowing victims to receive compensation from the government 
only if they agreed not to sue the airlines); Frequently Asked Questions, GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq#Q1 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) 
(describing how after White House involvement, BP replaced its original claims facility and 
created a new escrow facility which, although funded by BP, is administered by a neutral 
third party). 
 55. FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 78–79. 
 56. See Guanyu Jinyibu Fahui Susong Tiaojie zai Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui 
zhong Jiji Zuoyong de Ruogan Yijian (关于进一步发挥诉讼调解在构建社会主义和谐社 
会中积极作用的若干意见) [Regarding the Next Step Towards Litigation Development 
According to Socialist Principals and Harmonious Society] (promulgated by the Sup. 
People‘s Ct., Mar. 7, 2007, effective Mar. 7, 2007) 125 SUP. PEOPLE‘S CT. GAZ. 15, art. 10, 
available at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=106477 [hereinafter Next 
Step]. See generally Andrew J. Green, Tort Reform with Chinese Characteristics: Towards a 
“Harmonious Society” in the People‟s Republic of China, 10 SAN DIEGO INT‘L L. J. 121 
(2008).  
 57. See Next Step, supra note 56, art. 2.  
 58. See generally Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory 
Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 25 (Margaret Woo & Mary Gallagher eds., 2011) 
(providing a helpful analysis of this trajectory of Chinese legal reform). 
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reforms and the need for more formal adjudication.59 In those years, 
Chinese courts were given greater breathing space to decide cases 
between two private parties.60 There were even nascent efforts by the 
Supreme People‘s Court to reinterpret national legislation in order to 
empower courts to deal with complicated civil cases.61 
However, a more conservative trend has since emerged that 
focuses on social harmony and stability. Chinese scholars and judges 
are rediscovering the virtues of mediation, including its efficiency, 
cost effectiveness, and humanity.62 The Supreme People‘s Court, in a 
series of judicial interpretations, has steered particular ―socially 
significant‖ cases towards mediation, with or without a litigant‘s 
consent.63 Mediation may provide such harmony, but it can also 
downplay the litigant‘s freedom of choice.64 And so, the preference 
of mediation over adjudication in China is also a preference for 
maintaining ―order over freedom.‖  
B. “Duties over Rights” 
Where mediation fails, litigation begins. If the litigation is 
―socially significant,‖ the Chinese state remains involved both to 
shape the issues and to ensure the presence of the appropriate 
parties.65 In the Armillarisin A injections case, eleven patients and 
their families filed lawsuits against the Hospital instead of settling 
their claims through government-sponsored mediation.66 The other 
ten patients and their families refrained from the litigation, but 
closely followed the ongoing trial.67 While the plaintiffs‘ injuries 
were the result of counterfeit medicine, the Hospital was named as 
the sole defendant in the lawsuit, rather than the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer.68  
 
 59. See generally Benjamin Liebman, Chinese Courts: Restricted Reforms, 2007 CHINA 
Q. 620; Donald C. Clarke, Legislating for a Market Economy, 2007 CHINA Q. 567. 
 60. See supra note 59. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally Fu Hualing & Cullen, supra note 58, at 48–53. 
 64. See generally Next Step, supra note 56. 
 65. See, e.g., 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 27, art. 119 (―If a party who must 
participate in a joint action fails to participate in the proceedings, the people‘s court shall 
notify him to participate.‖). 
 66. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 368.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 368. The plaintiffs‘ attorney explained to the court and in media interviews 
why they sued only the Hospital. For one thing, Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals had already been 
fined 19,200,000RMB by the Food and Drug Administration in Heilongjiang Province, and 
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In response, the Hospital argued that it was not legally liable 
since it had followed all appropriate laws pertaining to the utilization 
of Armillarisin A.69 The Hospital also maintained that it was the first 
to discover the problem and further, that it had promptly reported the 
issue.70 Therefore, the Hospital contended that the manufacturers of 
Armillarisin A, not the Hospital, should be legally responsible for the 
effects of the product.71 For these reasons, the Hospital requested 
permission from the court to join manufacturer Qiqihar 
Pharmaceuticals, and the distributors, Jinhengyuan and Guangdong 
Medicines, as defendants in the lawsuits.72 The plaintiffs protested, 
arguing that they ―had the right of action,‖ which included the right 
to determine which defendants to sue, and that both the Hospital‘s 
application of joinder and the Court‘s decision to grant it therefore 
compromised those rights.73 In an interview, the plaintiff‘s attorney 
explained that joinder in this case would have negative consequences, 
such as lengthier litigation delaying timely compensation to the 
plaintiffs.74 In June 2007, however, the court disagreed with the 
plaintiffs, ordering that the two sellers and manufacturers be joined as 
defendants.75  
The ability of the Chinese court to bring in new defendants 
absent consent of the plaintiffs underscores the perennial tension 
between the preference for substantive justice and respect for party 
autonomy.76 The right of the defendants to join interested parties not 
initially included a lawsuit is a situation that every legal system must 
address.77 For example, in the United States, where party autonomy is 
 
the persons-in-charge had been prosecuted. As a result, the company was not in a position to 
make compensation. For another, since there was no direct relationship between the 
plaintiffs and the pharmaceutical sellers, joinder of these defendants would lead to protracted 
litigation and ultimately would not result in timely compensation to the plaintiffs. Id. at 368 
n. 18.  
 69. Id. at 368. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Cai Yanmin, Qieryao Jiayaoan Minshi Shenpan zhi Fansi (1) 
(齐二药”假药案民事审判之反思 (1)) [Thoughts on the Qiqihaer Er Counterfeit Drug 
Litigation (1)], BJ148 (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.bj148.org/fxyj/jaxl/qt/201109/ 
t20110922_160658.html [hereinafter Thoughts 1]; Cai Yanmin, Qieryao Jiayaoan Minshi 
Shenpan zhi Fansi (2) (齐二药”假药案民事审判之反思 (2)) [Thoughts on the Qiqihaer Er 
Counterfeit Drug Litigation (2)], UNILAW, http://www.unilaw.cn/Read.asp?id 
=206 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Thoughts 2].  
 72. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 368–69. 
 73. Id. at 369.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 27, art. 119; FED. R. CIV. P. 19 & 24. 
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strong and the plaintiff is ―the master‖ of his litigation,78 the plaintiff 
may sue the wrong defendant or leave out certain defendants, and 
only under certain exceptions can the defendant and/or the court 
reshape the litigation.79 The plaintiff may choose to sue one joint 
tortfeasor and not the other. The defendant‘s job is to deny and 
defend the plaintiff‘s claim against it, and if necessary, himself 
pursue against the other tortfeasor for contribution. The court‘s job is 
to ensure a level playing field. As noted by Stephen Burbank, the 
structure of American litigation is very much left to the parties, 
particularly to plaintiffs, as to whom they wants to sue.80 
By contrast, in China, joinder of defendants appears to be less 
restrictive, less dependent on the will of plaintiffs, and more reliant 
on perceptions of efficiency and substantive justice. This sense of 
who should be brought into an action can override the plaintiff‘s right 
of autonomy over the lawsuit. Article 119 of the Chinese Civil 
Procedure Code states simply that ―If a party who must participate in 
a joint action fails to participate in the proceedings, the people‘s court 
shall notify him to participate.‖81 The rule gives the court discretion 
to join necessary parties with or without request from the litigants. 
When a defendant requests joinder, the court may also order it if, 
after investigation, the court finds the request to have a basis.82  
In the Armillarisin A case, the court concluded that this is a case 
of necessary joint action and that the existing defendant, the Hospital, 
had the right to demand joinder of the other parties, and that the court 
could join the other defendants even without the consent of the 
plaintiffs.83 Much to the parties‘ dismay, however, rather than 
dismissing the case against the Hospital, the court maintained the 
 
 78. See The Fair v. Kholer Die Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (―Of course the party who 
brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon . . . .‖); Stanley Blumenfeld, 
Artful Pleading and Removal Jurisdiction: Ferreting Out the True Nature of a Claim 35 
UCLA L. REV. 315, 316 (1987) (―The underlying notion [of The Fair], which is now firmly 
entrenched in federal procedural law, is that the plaintiff is free to chart the course of his own 
lawsuit.‖). 
 79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
 80. Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil Litigation: Curse or 
Cure? 3 (Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper No. 166), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/ 
upenn_wps/166. 
 81. See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 27, art. 119. 
 82. Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa Ruogan Wenti de 
Yijian (关于适用《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》若干问题的意见) [Opinions on 
Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People‘s Republic of China], 31 Sup. People‘s 
Gaz. 70 (Sup. People‘s Ct. 1992) (China). 
 83. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 372. 
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Hospital as a defendant in the case.84 The court reasoned that ―it 
could fully adjudicate responsibly only if all of the possible obligors 
were joined to the lawsuits.‖85  
But it is unclear how the Hospital could be viewed as a joint 
tortfeasor since it merely administered the medicine and was in no 
way involved in its manufacture or distribution.86 Indeed, the 
Hospital pointed out that the pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
distributors were the real parties in interest.87 The pharmaceutical 
producers maintained control of the counterfeit medicines before they 
were used by the plaintiffs.88 The Hospital also noted that, pursuant 
to Chinese laws and regulations, it is both the producers and the 
sellers who were obligated to maintain the quality of pharmaceuticals 
during distribution and the injuries caused by counterfeit medicines 
were the result of the failure of both the producers and the sellers to 
fulfill these obligations.89 Consequently, the Hospital argued that 
under Chinese tort law,90 the producers and sellers were the actual 
interested persons, not the Hospital.91 The court, therefore, could 
have decided to dismiss the case against the Hospital.92  
Indeed, it is only with a broad reading of Chinese tort law and 
liberal application of Chinese joinder rules in the context of 
promoting a ―harmonious society‖ could the court have kept the 
Hospital in the case.93 This appears to be true, as in fact, the Supreme 
People‘s Court has explained that, in personal injury compensation 
cases, all joint tortfeasors shall be made defendants when the plaintiff 
sues only some of them.94 Chinese scholars provided guidance on the 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 375. 
 87. See id. at 371; 374–75. 
 88. Id. at 371. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. See also Thoughts 1, supra note 71.  
 92. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 372.  
 93. See Green supra note 56, at 149–53. The author predicts continued favorable results 
for plaintiffs as China seeks to emphasize protection for those less well off as part of the 
―harmonious society‖ policy. Id. 
 94. Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruogan 
Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释) 
[Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Some Issues concerning the Application of 
Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury] (promulgated by the Sup. 
People‘s Ct., Dec. 26, 2003, effective May 1, 2004) (Lawinfochina) art. 5, available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3416 [hereinafter Personal Injury 
Interpretation]. 
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joinder rule, explaining that a necessary ―joint action‖ can arise when 
there are one or more claims involving common rights and 
obligations as well as several parties who must initiate or respond to a 
lawsuit together.95 A determination that the claims should be tried as 
―necessary joint actions‖ may simply mean that the court cannot 
adjudicate them separately.96 This is a broad view of ―joint actions‖ 
consistent with the approach of Chinese tort law, which emphasizes 
both rights and responsibilities, rather than rights as either a sword or 
shield.97 
In the Amarmillarism A case, there are several further 
explanations as to why the court kept the Hospital in the litigation. 
The court may have believed that by joining the parties and ensuring 
that all interested persons were brought into the action, the court 
could better determine the facts, the responsible parties, and their 
respective liabilities. In this way, substantial justice would be more 
efficiently done, even if the litigation did not proceed in exactly the 
manner as anticipated by the plaintiffs. Alternatively, the court may 
have believed that the Hospital owed a duty to the plaintiffs, whether 
it was a legal or a moral one, such that the Hospital should be made 
answerable to the plaintiff. With either justification we see the 
emphasis of ―duty over rights‖ playing out in this litigation through 
the Chinese court‘s affirmative efforts to shape the litigation. 
C. “Group Interest over Individual Interests” 
Finally, the court in the Armillarisin A cases, having brought in 
all possible defendants, proceeded to hold all of them liable for 
plaintiffs‘ injuries.98 By appearing to impose collective liability rather 
than determine individual culpability in its attempt to resolve the 
dispute, the court‘s ruling appeared to go beyond the requirements of 
China‘s products liability law.99  
 
 95. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 371. 
 96. Zhang Wusheng (章武生) & Duan Housheng (段厚省), Biyao Gongtong Susong de 
Lilun Wuqu yu Zhidu Chonggou (必要共同诉讼的理论误区与制度重构) [Theoretical 
Misunderstanding and Institutional Reshaping Necessary Joint Actions], 1 SCI. L. 111, 112 
(2007). 
 97. George W. Conk, A New Tort Code Emerges in China: An Introduction to the 
Discussion With a Translation of Chapter 8 – Tort Liability, of the Official Discussion Draft 
of the Proposed Revised Civil Code of the People‟s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT‘L L. 
J. 935, 940 (2007). 
 98. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71. 
 99. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71. 
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As discussed above, Chinese products liability law imposes the 
burden on the pharmaceutical manufacturer and distributors to prove 
that they had carried out their responsibilities regarding Armillarisin 
A. Article 41 the 2000 Product Quality Law specifies that 
manufacturers are liable for injuries caused by defective products 
unless they can prove one of the following: 1) they did not put the 
defective product into circulation; 2) defects later found did not exist 
at the time the product was put into circulation; or 3) the defects 
could not have been detected at the time of their release due to 
scientific or technological reasons.100 Meanwhile, Article 42 of the 
same act provides that sellers will be liable for injury caused by 
defective products unless they can prove: 1) they are not at fault for 
the damages caused by the defective goods; and 2) they can identify 
the manufacturer and other suppliers of the product.101 Finally, 
Article 35 of the Pharmaceutical Administration Regulations requires 
that ―a pharmaceutical wholesale enterprise perform a quality 
examination on medicines purchased for the first time from a 
pharmaceutical producer.‖102  
In the Armillarisin A case, the manufacturer (Qiqihar 
Pharmaceuticals) did not respond to the lawsuit or appear in court, let 
alone provide evidence that the company had satisfied the 
requirements of Article 41.103 The distributor, Jinhengyuan, which 
bought the medicine directly from Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals, admitted 
in court that because of inexperience, it did not conduct a quality 
inspection of the medicine.104 The other distributor, Guangdong 
Medicines, signed a sales contract with Jinhengyuan but received the 
medicine directly from Qiqihar, and admitted that upon receipt it only 
examined such items as outer packages and sale documents.105  
As could be expected, the court found the manufacturer, Qiqihar 
Pharmaceuticals, liable for failing to satisfy the requirements of 
Article 41 of the Product Liability Law, and the distributors, 
Jinhengyuan and Guangdong Medicines, liable as wholesale 
 
 100. Product Quality Law (2000 Amendment) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l 
People‘s Cong., Feb. 22, 1993, effective, Sept. 1, 1993), art. 41, http://www.bjkw.gov.cn/ 
n244495/n244634/2658335.html [hereinafter Product Quality Law]. 
 101. Id. art. 42. 
 102. Yaopin Guanli Fa (药品管理法) [Law on Pharmaceutical Administration] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Feb. 28, 2001, effective Dec. 1, 
2001), art. 35, http://www.sda.gov.cn/WS01/CL0064/23396.html. 
 103. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.  
 104. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.  
 105. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71.  
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enterprises for failing to conduct proper examinations on the 
medicine.106 The court believed that, if the manufacturer or the 
distributor had carried out its responsibilities of quality control, the 
counterfeit medicine would never have entered the market or gone 
into the Hospital.107 
The Hospital maintained that it did not have the same 
responsibility for quality control as that prescribed to the 
manufacturer and the distributors.108 Instead, the Hospital argued that 
its only obligation was to abide by the administrative regulations for 
public bidding but since Guangdong Medicine had won the public 
bidding for Armillarisin A organized by the provincial government, 
all hospitals within the province were forced to purchase the 
medicine from Guangdong Medicine.109 
The court rejected the Hospital‘s argument and instead, imposed 
joint liability on the Hospital, together with the manufacturer and 
distributors.110 It was unclear what action taken by the Hospital could 
be pinpointed to as unlawful or so closely connected to the 
manufacturer and distributor‘s actions as to constitute liability. The 
court subsequently explained that the Hospital was held liable 
because the Hospital constitutes a ―seller‖ and therefore bears fault-
based liability. In the alternative, the Hospital was also held under 
―strict liability‖ or no-fault liability under the General Principles of 
the Civil Code.111 The Hospital, however, pointed out that the 
General Principles of the Civil Code only provides for ―strict 
liability‖ liability if the underlying substantive law so specified, (that 
―civil liability shall be borned [sic] even in the absence of fault, if the 
law so stipulates,‖) and the Products Quality Law places 
responsibility on sellers only for the defects they cause.112 Here, the 
Hospital argued that ―strict liability‖ did not apply, that it did not 
cause any defects, and that it should not be held liable.113 
 
 106. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12 at 373. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 374. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 375. 
 111. General Principles of the Civil Law of the People‘s Republic of China, (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 
106, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383941.htm. 
 112. See Product Quality Law, supra note 100, arts. 30–31 (emphasis added). 
 113. See Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71. 
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Yet, the court‘s imposition of liability on the Hospital may 
nevertheless be consistent with how Chinese courts have interpreted 
Chinese substantive tort law, and with broad collective liability. In 
―Interpretation of the Supreme People‘s Court of Some Issues 
Concerning the Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on 
Compensation for Personal Injury,‖ the Supreme People‘s Court has 
specified that liability shall be imposed if the ―injurious acts are 
directly combined and result in the same injury consequence even if 
there is no joint intent or joint negligence.‖ 114 This same opinion also 
made clear that  
where two or more persons have no joint intent or joint 
negligence, but separately commit several acts that are 
indirectly combined and result in the same injury, they shall 
bear corresponding compensation liabilities respectively in 
appropriate proportions upon the extent of their faults.115  
In holding the Hospital liable, the court in the Armillarisin A 
case must have concluded that either the acts of all four defendants 
combined to produce a single injury to each plaintiff or that the 
defendants‘ separate acts were so closely connected that it was 
impossible to ascertain what share of the damage each defendant 
inflicted. But if the Hospital‘s sole role was to apply the injections as 
instructed, the court could have viewed that service as a separate act 
distinct from the manufacturer or seller‘s liability. The court could 
have declined to hold the Hospital liable, or at least only hold the 
Hospital responsible for its respective portion of liability. 
Significantly, even the plaintiffs admitted in court that they never 
blamed the Hospital for the medical services received and that their 
claim was one based on the infringement of product quality.116 It is 
only by reading broad collective liability into Chinese tort law and 
applying that liability liberally that the court could hold the Hospital 
liable. 
Finally, one additional factor may have affected the court‘s 
ruling on liability. Given the criminal prosecution of the 
manufacturer and the relatively small size of the distributor and seller 
companies, the Hospital was the sole defendant financially able to 
provide relief to the plaintiffs.117 The court‘s ruling could thus be 
 
 114. Personal Injury Interpretation, supra note 94, art. 3.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 375. 
 117. Thoughts 1, supra note 71; Thoughts 2, supra note 71. 
13-WOO MACRO (Author Reviewed) DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2012 10:15 AM 
2012] BOUNDED LEGALITY  253 
seen as an attempt to provide redistributive and substantive justice for 
the injured plaintiffs.118 It may also reflect a sense of group 
obligation, and the concern of providing group relief for these 
plaintiffs, over and above the sense of individual liability.119 And so, 
it can still be said that Chinese law emphasizes ―order over freedom, 
duties over rights, and group interests over individual ones.‖ 
II. THE PATH OF CHINESE LEGAL REFORMS 
Even as Chinese law continues to emphasize ―order over 
freedom, duties over rights, and group interests over individual 
ones,‖120 the inquiry cannot end there. Equally important, one must 
ask who is defining the nature of this ―order over freedom,‖ the 
identity of which ―duties‖ should prevail over which ―rights,‖ and 
what ―group interests‖ override ―individual ones.‖ The answer for 
China is inevitably the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).121 To 
understand legal reform in China, one must take into account the role 
of the CCP as the driving force for the Chinese developmental state 
and how its involvement in legal reforms has resulted in the latest 
turn—one that establishes a multi-track litigation system, in which 
minor and relatively insignificant cases are mediated, commercial 
cases are adjudicated, and mass cases are carefully controlled and 
shaped by the Chinese state (as exemplified by the Amarillarism A 
litigation).122 The most recent discussions on the amendments to the 
Chinese procedural codes reveal efforts to codify just such a strategy.  
This multi-track strategy to civil litigation is yet the latest phase 
in the history of Chinese legal reform. One could even say that it is a 
response to deficiencies created by the privatization of the legal 
profession coupled with greater formality.123 As discussed earlier, for 
a time in the mid-1990s, the Chinese state encouraged the use of the 
courts in the hopes that the courts could assist in stabilizing society 
 
 118. Woo & Cai Yanmin, supra note 12, at 375. 
 119. See generally Green, supra note 56. 
 120. SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 1, at 171. 
 121. In December 2007, Chinese president Hu Jintao urged the judiciary to subordinate 
the written law to the interests of the CCP and the maintenance of ―social stability:‖ ‖In their 
work, the grand judges and grand procurators shall always regard as supreme the party's 
cause, the people's interest and the constitution and laws.‖ See Cohen, Body Blow, supra 
note 8. 
 122. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Sida Liu, With or Without the Law: The Changing Meaning of Ordinary Legal 
Work in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
supra note 58, at 234–69 (providing a useful discussion of the growth of legal technocracy in 
China). 
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and serve as a neutral forum for litigants trying to rein in local 
bureaucrats.124 Speaking at the landmark national civil justice 
conference held between December 1978 and January 1979, Jiang 
Hua, the former President of the Supreme People‘s Court, spoke of 
the necessity and legitimacy of civil justice, positioned the Supreme 
People‘s Court to take the lead in judicial administration, and started 
to assert the Supreme People‘s Court‘s institutional autonomy.125 
After the conference, Chinese legal reformers enhanced their efforts 
at procedural and institutional change while the Supreme People‘s 
Court decreed that Chinese courts should ―further improve the work 
of trying civil cases, protect the civil rights and interests of citizens 
and legal persons according to the law, and promote the just, safe, 
civilized, and healthy development of society.‖126  
For the next twenty years, China was determined to develop a 
professional legal system, leaving the particular design of civil justice 
to the expertise of the judiciary.127 More law schools were established 
and qualifications for both lawyers and judges were both 
strengthened and clarified.128 In a series of Five Year Plans, the 
Supreme People‘s Court reduced the inquisitorial and investigative 
role of judges while simultaneously increasing the responsibility of 
parties to produce evidence and prove their case.129 During this 
period, Chinese judicial reformers urged the development of civil 
courts that would play a more general, public, and normative role in 
applying and proclaiming rules.130 Yet, in many ways, such efforts 
limited citizen‘s empowerment even as they added to it. Legal 
markets created great disparities in the availability of legal services 
between rich and poor; formal procedures increased the alienation 
 
 124. Ren Jianxin (任建新), Supreme People‘s Court President, Address before the Fourth 
Session of the Eighth National People‘s Congress (Mar. 12, 1996), in BBC SUMMARY OF 
WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 9, 1996, at 26; Renmin Ribao (人民日报) [China Daily], Mar. 
14, 1997. 
 125. See Minshi Shenpan Gongzuo Tongdeng Zongyao (民事审判工作同等重要) [Civil 
Justice is Equally Important], SINA (Aug. 14, 2007), http://book.sina.com.cn/nzt/history/ 
cha/jianghuaz/66.shtml, cited in Hualing Fu, Access to Justice in China: Potential, Limits 
and Alternatives, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, 
supra note 58, at 25. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., First Five-Year Reform Program, supra note 29.  
 128. See generally Liebman, supra note 59.  
 129. See Second Five-Year Reform Program for the People's Courts (2004-2008) (CECC 
Partial Translation), CONG.-EXEC.COMM‘N ON CHINA, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtual 
Acad/index.phpd?showsingle=38564 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Second Five-
Year Reform Program]. 
 130. See generally Liebman, supra note 59. 
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and burdens of poor litigants such that they were unable to access the 
judicial system.131 
Facing pressure from the international community as well as the 
needs of a market economy, the Chinese state had applied market 
principles to the provision of legal services. But in the short run, the 
creation of a legal market has not led to greater access to justice. 
While China now has more than 15,888 law firms with 155,457 full-
time lawyers, or one lawyer for every 8,586 people,132 fully 85 
percent of licensed lawyers work in large or medium sized cities, 
leaving only a small percentage to serve the vast population in rural 
areas.133 Equally problematic, lawyers are unevenly distributed, not 
only with more lawyers in the cities than in the countryside, but also 
in the matters they handle.134 Lawyers tend to enter the more 
lucrative areas of commerce rather than the less lucrative areas of 
family law, debt, and employment.135 With the latter being areas of 
greatest concern to ordinary citizens, there exists a tremendous gap in 
the availability of services between the urban rich and the rural poor. 
Similar resource disparities exist within the Chinese courts. The 
different levels of economic development among the provinces are 
reflected in the disparate resources provided to judges and local 
courts.136 Until recently, local governments, rather than the central 
government, appointed and paid Chinese judges, subjecting Chinese 
courts to the whims of local government budgets. Poor provinces 
with limited resources, such as Hubei, Guizhou, and Sichuan, even 
lacked physical court facilities and faced shortages of judicial 
 
 131. See, e.g., Margaret Y.K. Woo, Christopher Day & Joel Hugenberger, Migrant‟s 
Access to Civil Justice, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L L. REV. 167 (2007). 
 132. 22-6 Basic Statistics on Lawyers, Notarization and Mediation, CHINA STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/html/W2206e.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 
2012). See also Geoffrey A. Fowler, Sky Canaves, & Juliet Ye, Chinese Seek a Day in 
Court: With New Faith in Rule of Law, More Citizens File Suits, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2008, 
at A12; China Has More Than 143,000 Lawyers, PEOPLE‘S DAILY ONLINE., Apr. 16, 2008, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6393774.html.. 
 133. Fu Hualing, Access to Justice in China: Potentials, Limits, and Alternatives, in 
LEGAL REFORMS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM: A COMPARISON OF ASIAN COMMUNIST REGIMES 
163, 167 (John Gillespie & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2010). 
 134. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA‘S LONG MARCH TOWARDS RULE OF LAW 362 (2002). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Linchun Zhang (张林春), Zhongguo Zhongxibu Diqu Sifa Jigou Rencai Liushi 
Wenti Yanzhong (中国中西部地区司法机构人才流失问题严重) [The Serious Problem of 
Personnel Loss in Judicial Institutions in Central and Western Regions], XINHUA WANG 
[XINHUA NET] (Mar. 12, 2006), http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/200603/12/content 
_4295068.htm. 
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manpower.137 Recognizing this disparity of resources between 
different provinces, the Chinese state has recently begun efforts to 
distribute funds directly from the central government budget.138 Until 
that reform is fully implemented, however, judicial resources are still 
deficient in many provinces. 
This scarcity of lawyers and judges proved to be a huge problem 
particularly as China increasingly formalized its litigation procedures. 
In an effort to ―modernize‖ and to alleviate the burgeoning workload 
of Chinese judges, the Chinese state moved away from a civil law 
inquisitorial system toward rules that relieve Chinese judges from the 
burden of investigation and impose on litigants the burden of coming 
forward with evidence.139 Absent the assistance of judges to 
investigate and gather evidence, poor litigants need legal 
representation more than ever and without it, are at the mercy of 
litigants with greater economic resources.  
Due to all of the above factors—a lack of lawyers, a lack of 
judges and an increased burden on unrepresented litigants, public 
discontent with the courts has mounted.140 Grievance petitions filed 
with the Chinese state have skyrocketed: many of these petitions deal 
with litigants dissatisfied with court treatment.141 In a number of 
areas, we are seeing the next phase of Chinese legal reforms as the 
Chinese state tightens its control over the courts and over the process 
of civil litigation. This can be seen in the latest set of proposed 
amendments to the Chinese Civil Procedure Code. 
 
 137. Id. See also Daibiao Suo Weidong Weiyuan Chen Zhilun tan Falü Rencai Duiwu 
Jianshe (代表索维东委员陈智伦谈法律人才队伍建设) [Representatives Discuss 
Construction of Legal Personnel System], TENGXUN WANG [TENCENT WEB] (Mar. 9, 2006), 
http://news.qq.com/a/20060309/001799.htm (describing similar problems in Sichuan). 
 138. In 2008, the Political and Legislative Affairs committee of the Central Committee of 
the CCP issued an opinion urging a change from local to national financing of the courts. See 
Zhong Yang Zhgen Fawei Yuanhui Guanyu Shenhua Sifati Zhihe Gongzuo Jigai Geruo 
Ganwen Ti De Yi Jian (中央政法委员会关于深化司法体制和工作机制改革若干问题的 
意见) [Initial Funding for China‘s Legal System Initially Established], 360DOC, 
http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0421/11/1993767_111229089.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 
2012). 
 139. See Renmin Fayuan Dierge Wunian Gaige Gongyao (2004–2008) 
(人民法院第二个五年改革纲要(2004–2008)) [Supreme People's Court Notification on the 
Issue of The Second Five-year Reform Outline of the People's Courts] (promulgated by the 
Sup. People‘s Ct., Oct. 26, 2005) 110 SUP. PEOPLE‘S CT. GAZ. 8 (Sup. People‘s Ct. 2005), 
available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law.view.asp?id=120832 (last visited Apr. 8, 
2012). 
 140. See Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: “Informed Disenchantment” 
and the Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 783, 784 (2006). 
 141. Carl Minzner, Xinfang: Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. 
INT‘L. L. 103, 106 (2006) (―Many petitions . . . are extra-legal appeals for court decisions.‖). 
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On June 10, 2011, the Central Committee Legislative Affairs 
Bureau posted draft revisions to the Chinese Civil Procedure Code.142 
The Chinese Civil Procedure Code was initially promulgated in 1982 
for trial implementation, formally enacted in 1991, and most recently 
amended in 2007.143 However, the ever increasing number of civil 
lawsuits and the over-burdened Chinese trial courts have since led to 
discussions of yet another round of changes to the Civil Procedure 
Code.144 The 2011 draft amendments are designed to address some of 
the country‘s concerns with social instability, the increased workload 
of Chinese judges, and the external pressures of a World Trade 
Organization (WTO) treaty regime that urges greater access to justice 
and greater transparency of the courts.145 Most significantly, the 
proposed amendments would codify the multi-track approach to 
cases.146 
First and foremost, the proposed amendments to the Chinese 
Civil Procedure Code would formalize the emphasis on mediation as 
an effective mechanism for resolving disputes, noting that ―suitable 
cases should first be mediated.‖147 New subsections would also be 
added to protect the integrity of mediated agreements.148 Litigants 
may apply for enforcement of extra-judicial mediated agreements by 
the courts, so long as the agreement is filed with the courts within 30 
days of the agreement.149 Under the amended rules, a civil court may, 
after investigation, enforce the agreement or require the parties to 
mediate again, if it finds the agreement unlawful.150  
Along with mediation, the revisions would also make clear that 
simplified procedures are to be used for many civil cases in which the 
 
 142. Minshi Susong Fa Xiuzhengan (Caoan) Tiaowen ji Caoan Shuoming 
(民事诉讼法修正案(草案)条文及草案说明) [Draft Amendment to Chinese Civil 
Procedure Code and its Explanations], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc 
/xinwen/syxw/2011-10/29/content_1678367.htm [hereinafter 2011 Amendments]. 
 143. Minsufa Xiugai Jianzhi Liudanan (民诉法修改剑指六大难) [Six Major Difficulties 
in the Revision of the Civil Procedure Code], NAT‘L PEOPLE‘S CONG. (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/msssfxg/2011-10/26/content_1677140.htm. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.  
 146. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
 147. 2011 Amendments, supra note 142, para. 25 (inserting a new article as new Article 
121).  
 148. Id. para. 39 (amending Chapter 15 by inserting new Section 6 (Confirming Cases 
regarding Mediated Agreements) and Section 7 (Implementing Cases regarding Security 
Interests)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
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facts are relatively undisputed and the amount in controversy is not 
large. One new proposed amendment would require that simple cases 
with a value below 5,000 RMB be limited to one trial only.151 A 
second amendment would expand the simplified procedures‘ 
parameters.152 In addition to requiring some simple cases to use 
simplified procedures, parties themselves could agree to the use of 
simplified procedures.153 Finally, a third amendment would require 
that cases from the basic people‘s court and those sent out from the 
trial courts use more convenient methods to summon litigants, deliver 
documents, and try cases, but in all cases protect the litigants‘ rights 
and opinions.154  
Second, responding to the problem of courts refusing to accept 
complaints, particularly in difficult and socially significant cases, the 
proposed revisions would secure a litigant‘s right to file a complaint 
and to present evidence. Drafters of the revisions added a new clause 
to Article 111155 which would require a court to accept a filed case 
meeting the requirements of Article 118.156 The court‘s decision 
whether to accept a case must be made within seven days and 
litigants are notified of their right to appeal an adverse decision.157  
Similarly, to implement a litigant‘s right to present evidence, 
these articles specify the timing and procedure for the receipt of 
evidence. Under the proposed amendments, a court must accept the 
evidence offered by a party and must record under court seal the type 
of evidence presented, the number of pages, the time of receipt, and 
the length of the presentation.158 The new amendments also focus on 
the pretrial conference, at which the parties would focus on the major 
points in dispute, the nature of the evidence to be presented at trial, 
 
 151. Id. para. 35 (inserting a new article as new Article 161).  
 152. Id. para. 33 (changing Article 142 to new Article 156 and inserting a new subsection 
in new Article 156 as Subsection (2)).  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. para. 34 (changing Article 144 to new Article 158 and modifying new Article 
158). 
 155. Id. para. 27 (changing Article 112 to new Article 122 and modifying new Article 
122).  
 156. Id. para. 27 (changing Article 112 to new Article 122 and modifying new Article 
122). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. para. 10 (inserting two new articles as new Articles 65 and 66). 
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and the identification of points of agreement that would enable the 
parties to simplify the trial.159 
Third, in lieu of not accepting cases, these proposed articles set 
out the process by which Chinese judges would decide in the very 
initial stages of the litigation how to track civil cases. The People‘s 
Court must assess and track the case to one of the following 
possibilities: 1) an expedited procedure (du cu) translated loosely as 
―supervised procedure‖ if the case, such as a debt case, has few or no 
factual disputes; 2) a mediation, if the litigants‘ disputes are more 
substantial; 3) a simplified procedure or ordinary procedure, 
according to the needs of the case; and/or 4) a procedure for litigants 
to exchange evidence to clarify the points of dispute for cases that 
require a trial.160 The goal is that such tracking will leave very few 
cases for full adjudication and trial. It is through a multi-tracked 
system that litigation will be contained. 
As for socially significant cases, the revisions also grapple with a 
citizen‘s right to bring these cases with a broader social impact. In 
recent years, Chinese courts have discouraged group litigation. In 
2006, the All-China Lawyers Association even issued a ―guiding 
opinion‖ instructing law firms to assign only ―politically qualified‖ 
lawyers to cases involving ten or more litigants. Fears of instability 
have led courts to withdraw from group litigation. The proposed 
procedural revisions, however, recognize the need to expand standing 
for public interest cases beyond those who have sustained a direct 
injury to include relevant governmental organs and civil society 
organizations.161 In consumer protection and environmental cases, 
these entities may have standing to file suit on behalf of the public 
interest.162 Of course, expanding standing to government agencies 
will have the effect of bringing control of such cases back to the 
Chinese developmental state, this time as formal parties in 
litigation.163 
 
 159. Id. para. 25 (inserting a new article as new Art. 121). See explanation 1.1 (Adding a 
Provision of Mediation after Register). Id. 
 160. Id. para. 28 (inserting a new article as new Article 132). 
 161. Guiding Opinion of the All China Lawyers Association Regarding Lawyers Handling 
Cases of a Mass Nature, CONG.-EXEC. COMM‘N ON CHINA (May 30, 2006), 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=53258 (providing both the 
original Chinese and translated English versions). 
 162. 2011 Amendments, supra note 142, para. 8 (inserting a new article as new Article 
55). 
 163. Id. 
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Finally, the new provisions would also expand supervision over 
the courts. Prosecutors in China have the unique authority to 
supervise judicial work that is distinct from the role of appellate 
courts in reviewing cases. The current civil procedure code provides 
for one prosecutorial supervision method (kansu) under which an 
upper level prosecutor can file a protest with a lower court seeking 
retrial (reopening) of a legally effective judgment or with an upper 
level court for review if the judgment is not yet legally effective. 
Under the proposed amendments, Chinese prosecutors can also 
propose a new supervision method (jianyi) under which a prosecutor 
would propose to a court at the same level for the retrial of cases with 
legally effective judgments, mediated agreements, or arbitration 
decisions, so long as there is a newly discovered error, the case meets 
Article 198 conditions, or if a mediated agreement harms the public 
good.164 Alternatively, the prosecutor could also ask the an upper 
level prosecutor to file a kansu.165  
The amendments also increase the parameters of supervision. To 
address the problem of collusion between litigants and mediation 
authorities, a new provision would allow prosecutors to protest 
(kansu) or to petition for retrial in the executions of any judgments, 
or to challenge any mediated outcome that may harm the public 
good.166 The investigative authority of prosecutors would be 
increased to allow a prosecutor to investigate whether a protest 
(kansu) with the court at the next higher level or a proposal for retrial 
(jianyi) to the court at the same level is necessary.167 The prosecutor 
would also be empowered to review court records, question the 
litigants, or investigate beyond the case.168 Through these various 
amendments, the Chinese state would give itself a role as a litigant 
before the court to challenge results it does not like in cases of social 
significance. 
CONCLUSION 
The Chinese Communist Party at its 15th National Congress in 
1997 set the first ten-year target for national economic and social 
development with a basic strategy of ―governing the country 
 
 164. Id. para. 44 (changing Article 187 to new Article 206 and modifying new Article 
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according to law and building a socialist country ruled by law.‖169 By 
the end of August 2011, the Chinese legislature had enacted 240 
effective laws including the current constitution, 306 administrative 
regulations, and over 8,600 local regulations.170 In the areas of court 
and legal procedures, Chinese legal reforms adopted some elements 
of the adversary system including party autonomy and burdens of 
proof.171 But while the language of rights may have been easy to 
import, the process of rights assertion has been more difficult. Efforts 
to establish legal formality and legal markets in China have led to the 
dominance of technocracy and great disparity in access to justice. 
Concerns for social stability have led the Chinese state to retreat from 
formality and develop a multi-track civil dispute resolution system. 
For poor and rural residents, simplified procedures and informal 
mediation remain the preferred dispute resolution methods;172 while 
litigant autonomy holds sway in the run-of-the-mill commercial 
litigation. But in socially significant cases, the Chinese state is 
heavily involved—both through greater control of the litigation by 
the court and through greater supervision of the courts. 
Such a multi-track system, while born of necessity, may serve to 
defuse the potential of courts to serve democratic reforms. It follows 
from this view that China‘s legal system will focus more on 
efficiency than on participation by ordinary citizens, giving more 
weight to the state‘s view of justice than to the ordinary litigant. 
Indeed, just as China embarked on ―socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,‖ we are also witnessing ―rule of law with Chinese 
characteristics.‖ And the ―rule of law with Chinese characteristics‖ 
means a multi-tracked approach to rendering justice—one that 
focuses on preserving harmony rather than adjudicating right from 
wrong, dispute resolution rather than readjustment of public norms.  
And yet, the presence of the Chinese developmental state and 
―rule of law with Chinese characteristics‖ is inevitable. Therefore, the 
challenge for future legal reformers is to recognize the reality of a 
dominant state but work towards ways to incorporate and ensure 
 
 169. Establishment of the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics, INFO. 
OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-10/27/content_23738846.htm. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Features of the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics, INFO. OFFICE 
OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-10/27/content_23738836.htm. 
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citizens‘ voices into Chinese law and governance even within the 
structure of the dominant state. There are promising signs, such as in 
the area of increasing judicial transparency. The new revisions of the 
Civil Procedure Code would require that all judgments and judicial 
orders be made public and that the basis for the decision be explained 
in writing (New Articles 151, 153, and 155).173 Nevertheless, civil 
litigants must be given the freedom and opportunity to shape and 
formulate their own civil litigation before civil litigation can truly 
serve the democratic role of preserving citizen voices.  
 
 
 173. See 2011 Amendments, supra note 142, para. 32.  
